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1 Introduction
Partiality in philosophy generally refers to a special kind of concern for the inter-
ests of certain people over others (Stroud, 2010, p. 134), which can involve “prefer-
ence or fondness or affection for a particular person.” (Scheffler, 2010, p. 99) This 
version of partiality – that which might apply to our friends, intimates, and family 
members – can be distinguished from something like egoism, which is “an extreme 
form of partiality…that…gives overriding importance to just one individual’s wel-
fare.” (Hooker, 2013, 710) It can also be distinguished from something like prefer-
ential commitments to one’s own nation-state, which might typically ground debates 
regarding our local versus global moral responsibilities. (Tronto, 2012, p. 310) And 
the moral status of our partial relationships can vary accordingly: for instance, we 
might have the intuition that special moral attention to family members are gener-
ally acceptable, but that the same could not be said in regards to a racist group with 
whom one is associated, given the “pervasive injustice” that characterizes the lat-
ter. (Miller, 2005, p. 66) Still, the idea that certain partial ties – in particular, like 
those involving loving and caring familial relations – can be specially morally val-
ued holds significant sway in ethical literature.  Special partial relationships of this 
kind, it is said, may transform what is required of you morally: in the case of parents 
and children, for example, perhaps you have duties to provide for your own children, 
but not for all children. (Keller, 2013, p. 2) 
Yet, as Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift point out, even the partial relationships 
that are taken to be generally permissible sometimes enable participants to “exclude 
others from the mutual benefits their association yields…in ways that may interrupt 
equality.” (Brighouse and Swift, 2009, p. 44) That we all conduct these partial rela-
tionships to varying degrees appears undeniable – it is plausible to say, for instance, 
that most parents invest greater resources into their own children than other children. 
(Douglas, 2015, p. 2736) In practice, we might “[assign] more importance to the 
welfare or will of some individuals or groups than to the welfare or will of oth-
ers.” (Hooker, 2013, p. 717) But the potential for partial relationships to inflict at 
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least some degree of moral wrong, or be in tension with values like equality, is also 
plausible.
Thus, the notion of partiality in the moral realm has long worried philosophers, 
especially when contrasted with the notion of impartiality. On the one hand, if it is 
true that “morality…makes us all third parties to our own interests” (Feltham, 2010, 
p. 2) then it seems that my own interests, preferences, and projects, as well as that 
of those I love, cannot take special precedence in considerations of what ought to be 
done morally – I must instead take an impartialist perspective. On the other hand, 
if we take ourselves to have reason “for patterns of action and emotion towards 
our parents, siblings, friends, spouses, children…” (Kolodny, 2010, p. 169) then it 
appears that our close relationships normatively pull us back in the direction of a 
partial rather than impartial perspective (Wolf, 1992, p. 243).
Varying degrees of such partial associations hold between people – perhaps cer-
tain family relationships like parent-child relationships characterize some of the 
stronger associations, whereas fleeting friendships and cordial acquaintances con-
stitute weaker partial associations. While I will not attempt to resolve this debate 
here, my view on the matter echoes that of Marilyn Friedman’s perspective. Fried-
man states that personal relationships can “vary widely in their moral value” (Fried-
man, 1991, p. 820) because they may after all turn out to be exploitative, abusive, or 
oppressive – in the worst cases. The point to take away from the paragraphs above 
is simply that partial relationships of the kind described are taken to have palpable 
effects on ethically significant concepts, such as equality and justice. As such, these 
relationships are an important site of analysis for juxtaposition with moral concepts.
But I wish to now set aside the question of the purely ethical effects of partial 
relationships, and explore instead the epistemic dimensions of partial relationships, 
which generate interesting philosophical questions in their own right. Some have 
already gestured toward this connection from within ethics: for example, we might 
acknowledge that knowing certain others’ interests particularly well gives us moral 
reason to maintain and cultivate such relationships. (Crisp, 2018, p. 1) In the social 
epistemology literature, scholars like Anthony Quinton have pointed out that we “do 
not subject what our parents tell us in early life to critical examination,” (Quinton, 
2004, p. 7) despite also depending on them to develop the very epistemic capacities 
required to critically discern their claims. Clearly, there are lines of inquiry that lie 
at the intersection between ethics and social epistemology which might be fruitfully 
cashed out, providing a dialogical bridge between these fields.
One such contribution that can be made on the topic of partial relationships at the 
intersection between ethics and social epistemology consists of a critical examina-
tion on whether such relationships act as vehicles for epistemic injustice in unique 
ways. While our survey above shows that partial relationships implicate questions 
to do with justice and injustice, I am motivated to explore how epistemic injustice, 
rather than injustice in general, might be specially amplified by partial, rather than 
impartial, relationships. This analysis would especially benefit the social epistemol-
ogy literature by providing a context-sensitive account of the transmission of epis-
temic injustice between agents. In the first part of this paper, I lay out how partial 
relationships and their typical features are relevantly connected to the potential for, 
or incidences of, epistemic injustice. I will also show how the standard story told 
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about the mechanisms of epistemic injustice fail to satisfyingly explain how partial 
relationships exacerbate epistemic injustice, thus justifying a need for a deeper anal-
ysis of partial relationships in the social epistemology literature. The second part 
of my paper will proceed to then detail further why partial relationships are a par-
ticularly pernicious site of epistemic injustice. I will defend the view that features 
typical of partial relationships make epistemic injustice easier to mask, harder to 
identify, and more difficult to correct.
2  Partial relationships and their epistemic effects
Sullivan et  al. point out that social epistemologists have tended to consider social 
epistemic exchange at rather abstract dyadic levels (e.g. between a speaker and 
hearer), as taking place within scientific communities (e.g. as when one might pro-
pound the view that things like ‘truth’ and ‘facts’ are a matter of “social negotiation 
or politics” (Goldman, 2009, p. 2)), or perhaps “simulated networks with unclear 
ecological validity.” (Sullivan et al., 2020) Aside from this issue of how we ought to 
imagine the structure of epistemic social groups and their interaction in relation to 
knowledge production as a whole, however, the more particularized cares of agents 
in an epistemic group, and the specific nature of members’ relationships with each 
other, are underanalysed in the social epistemology literature. My objective herein is 
to highlight the ways we can be epistemically influenced by, and preferential to, our 
network of partial ties, and to consider how such phenomena is connected to epis-
temic injustice.
Let us outline the epistemic features we can plausibly take to be typical of partial 
relationships. We might, for instance, prioritize our lovers’ testimonies over that of 
other, competing testimonies; we may take our friends’ advice as more authorita-
tive; and family insights over our affairs may be treated as the most accurate. Epis-
temically speaking, we might say this phenomenon has ambivalent outcomes: one 
the one hand, one may argue that allowing our beliefs to be influenced and shaped 
by our personal relationships constitute “the paradigmatic case of epistemic irra-
tionality,” (Paul and Morton, 2018, p. 1) insofar as it is the case that such influ-
ence obscures whether the beliefs we hold to be true are actually true. Perhaps, one 
might say, we have stronger ethical rather than epistemic reasons to epistemically 
favour our close ties – to provide optimism and moral support for our loved ones, 
for instance. At the same time, we might say epistemic partiality can be innocu-
ous enough, and even have good consequences. It may just as well be that people 
who deeply care about one another can influence each other in ways that conduce to 
better exercise of certain epistemic virtues. For instance, we might be more open-
minded and non-judgmental of our friends, and we might hold one another to higher 
epistemic account when it comes to our beliefs and our belief-formation processes, 
precisely because it matters more to us to do so with our partial ties.
Despite this ambivalence – or perhaps even because of this ambivalence – there 
is a scenario where epistemic influence conducted through partial relationships 
might plausibly devolve into something more sinister. This, I take it, is due to the 
fact that there are ways we might be inconsistently epistemically influenced within 
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partial relationships that then make those very relationships a particularly pernicious 
site or vehicle of epistemic injustice – the latter of which is considered a serious vul-
nerability for certain epistemic agents. Epistemic injustice, standardly understood, 
is the phenomenon whereby agents might be “wrongfully disadvantaged in their 
capacity as epistemic subjects” (Fricker, 2015) due to unfair discrimination “…in 
our capacity as a knower based on prejudices about the speaker.” (Byskov, 2020, p. 
1) The most widely discussed mechanisms of epistemic injustice are of the Frick-
erian variety – paradigmatically, testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. 
The testimonial form of epistemic injustice is about a lack of credibility conferral 
from a would-be hearer toward a speaker because of some prejudice the hearer has 
about them; hermeneutical injustice is about a “structural prejudice in your concep-
tual framework.” (Langton, 2010, p. 459)
Debates about such epistemic injustice and its operation tend to be dominated by 
talk about unjust interactions and targeting between social groups in friction, even if 
the injustices are themselves individually perpetuated. For instance, Fricker claims 
that the central case of testimonial injustice has to do with identity-prejudicial cred-
ibility deficit, which a speaker may suffer by “…receiving deflated credibility from 
the hearer owing to identity prejudice on the hearer’s part, as in the case where the 
police don’t believe someone because he is black” (Fricker, 2007, p. 5) The injustice 
in this standard case is, in a sense, very clear – somebody’s testimony is discredited 
due to their being unfairly marginalized as a member of a minority group.
But recognizing and resisting this injustice as such would be even more difficult 
if at the same time the recipient fosters a particular stance of care towards the preju-
diced agent, and if the prejudiced agent is themselves frequently blindsided by their 
familiarity and comfortability with their target to consider that they could be epis-
temically undermining them. This is precisely the troubling sort of predicament we 
might find ourselves in via partial relationships, yet such relationships are surpris-
ingly under-considered in the role they play in epistemic injustice transmission. I 
want to clarify now that I do not view the Frickerian mechanism of epistemic injus-
tice as spelling out a nuanced enough account of what might go wrong epistemically 
within partial relationships, even though epistemic injustice in general might indeed 
just as easily occur between close friends as with strangers or adversaries. Yet if this 
was all that connected partial relationships and epistemic injustice, our discussion 
might have ended here: we would simply have pointed out that some incidences of 
epistemic injustice happen to take place within partial relationships, rather than to 
make a point that there is some peculiar feature or set of features in partial relation-
ships that make the epistemic injustice experienced within them unique. But, as I 
will argue, it is possible to form a much richer picture of how epistemic injustice is 
transmitted within such partial relationships by looking more closely at the peculi-
arities of the epistemic exchange that might occur within them.
Let us begin with an example, which hopefully illustrates why the Frickerian 
account of epistemic injustice is insufficient to capture the nuance generated by par-
tial relationships. Imagine a close familial relationship, in which an older sibling 
consistently demeans the opinions of a younger sibling merely because the latter 
is taken to be ‘the baby’ of the family. One might argue that this is a classic case 
of epistemic injustice, and that partial relationships are just one of many platforms 
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through which such identity prejudice-at-large might manifest. Several authors have 
already echoed the sentiment that children, for instance, can suffer epistemic injus-
tice. Havi Carel and Gita Gyorffy have said that testimonial injustice can arise for 
children because “children may seem irrational, with reduced powers of reasoning, 
flawed or non-existent memories, and be easily swayed.” (2014, p. 1256)
But is this all that is going on in the case of the older sibling devalidating the 
younger sibling’s views? I am inclined to say no: it appears to me that the epistemic 
injustice conducted here is not merely an instantiation of a general prejudice about 
children assimilated into the social dynamics of a sibling relationship. Rather, there 
is something in particular, and peculiar, about the relationship between the older 
and younger sibling in question which conduces to such a phenomenon. While the 
part about an adult’s prejudices towards younger children might be explained as a 
structurally commonplace issue in society, the way that epistemic injustice manifests 
and is experienced in the context of this relationship may only make sense by under-
standing the older sibling’s unique brashness towards their younger sibling, and the 
unique anxiety and wish on part of the younger sibling to not be viewed as ‘dumb’ 
or ‘stupid’ by their older sibling. The missing element of this story – not captured 
by the Frickerian account – may be the tendency for the older sibling to insult their 
younger sibling in ways that would not occur to them to do with their peers, or any-
one else for that matter, based on identity-prejudice; and, for the younger sibling to 
acclimatize to this treatment and internalize it in ways that they otherwise would not 
have if it were anyone else trying to undermine them.
Now consider another example. Gaslighting takes places when a hearer denies 
a speaker’s testimony – based on the speaker’s social identity – about a harm or 
wrong done to the speaker. (Stark, 2019, p. 221) Suppose someone gaslights their 
partner by denying the latter’s testimony regarding being recipient to constant verbal 
abuse in the relationship. The person gaslighting claims that the partner is being 
merely dramatic and accusatory to gain attention, and even brings up the fact that 
the partner has struggled with mental health issues in the past to further imply that 
they have a propensity to create imaginary problems due to their ‘emotional insta-
bility.’ By gaslighting, they bring it about that “…the other person views herself as 
deficient or completely incompetent concerning her ability to understand, interpret 
situations, think, and choose for herself.” (Spear, 2019, p. 7) Here again we might 
think that an intimate relationship constitutes the space within which a partner might 
try to make the other person feel inadequate and incompetent as an epistemic agent, 
and the way that certain gendered stereotypes about women’s apparent craziness (in 
our case, reinforced by bringing up the partner’s mental health history) might be 
adopted to reinforce gaslighting techniques.
Marilyn Friedman points out that partial relationships have “specific particulari-
ties which do not derive from the generic nature of the relationship nor from its for-
mal or informal social conventions.” (1991, p. 821) Thus, even emotionally abusive 
interactions within relationships “may be quite idiosyncratic to their interaction.” 
(Friedman, 1991, p.821) It is therefore worth exploring the network of epistemic 
influences within one’s partial relationships, and the particularized epistemic biases 
and tendencies established within them that amplify transmission of epistemic injus-
tice. If it is at all plausible that the special ethical allowances and treatments we 
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make within partial relationships extend to the epistemic realm, we ought to take 
seriously the fact that a generalist account of epistemic injustice may not be able to 
capture the more nuanced modes of transmission of epistemic injustice that occurs 
within more personalized relationships.
It is no trivial point that the epistemic injustices exhibited in the above exam-
ples – gaslighting within a relationship, epistemic undermining of family members, 
and so on – are enacted within the context of partial relationships. But why might 
epistemic injustice proliferate within them? One helpful text that illuminates partial 
ties and their epistemic corollaries is Sarah Stroud’s paper on ‘Epistemic Partial-
ity in Friendship’, in which she argues that friendship involves “not just affective 
or motivational partiality but epistemic partiality.” (2006, p.499) Friendship places 
certain demands on our beliefs, and our belief-formation. We exercise “differential 
doxastic practices” (Stroud, 2006, p. 505) as constitutive of the very friendships we 
value. For example, if we hear unsavoury rumours or gossip concerning our friend’s 
character, we might exert greater cognitive efforts to yield more favourable interpre-
tations of the evidence we are given. That is, we are “less likely to conclude that our 
friend acted disreputably…than we would be in the case of a nonfriend.” (Stroud, 
2006, p. 506) Thus the friendship somehow changes not only our belief-formation 
processes but also the very conclusions we draw in the end about them. As I hinted 
at the start of this section, the literature recognizes a tension between the ethical 
and the epistemic when it comes to close relationships. Stroud herself claims that 
while a good friend really is “biased or partial”, such epistemic practices “would 
be unfavourably evaluated by standard epistemological theories.” (Stroud, 2006, p. 
512) This is because these epistemic practices involve characteristics that go against 
what we might standardly take to be good epistemic practice, like imperviousness to 
new evidence and slowness to update one’s beliefs. (Stroud, 2006, p. 514)
Epistemically partial practices as seen in the case of friendship seem precisely 
the kinds that might govern many other close ties to varying degrees – in family, 
platonic, and intimate relationships – and which also constitute the grounds on 
which the potential perniciousness of these relationships as the sites and vehicles 
of epistemic injustice arise. Stroud’s view on epistemic partiality and friendship 
clues us into some of the common doxastic tendencies we exercise when it comes 
to our close ties which may make instances of epistemic injustice transmitted within 
these ties less obvious to us. We are at least sometimes inclined to perform standard 
doxastic practices – such as belief-updating, and so on – less well in the case of 
partial relationships than non-partial ones. The worry would be then that transmis-
sion of epistemically unjust treatment within partial relationships are unduly under-
recognized, masked, or even tolerated because of the special epistemic allowances 
agents make within these relationships. This occurs on top of the fact that – as Linda 
Radzik says – “love is exploitable,” meaning that the people we love can take advan-
tage of the fact that we are willing to make sacrifices for them. (2005, p. 45) Agents 
are, in short, prone to be vulnerable or susceptible to problematic sorts of influences 
in partial relationships, which in the end might enable epistemic injustice to be car-
ried out within them.
Our partiality is non-neutral as compared with our more impartial, unaffected 
stance. It is plausible that we are both too epistemically receptive towards our loved 
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ones, and at the same time too impervious to their epistemic behaviours, as well as 
susceptible to be deceived or exploited by them. This might be for a number of rea-
sons: perhaps I value what I think I know about someone more if they are someone 
I specially care about; perhaps I trust the word of those I care about above those I 
do not; perhaps I am more inclined to forgive the epistemic mishaps of my close ties 
as compared with strangers; perhaps there are certain things I don’t want to believe 
about the people I am partial to; perhaps I want to impress someone I care about 
over and above subjecting them to certain epistemic standards; and so on and so 
forth. It is these partial attitudes and tendencies that make us potentially susceptible 
to receive epistemically unjust treatment in ways that might be overlooked as merely 
a special quirk of the relationship, or not taken seriously at all. That is not to say 
that partial relationships will necessarily lead to this phenomenon; the point is that 
epistemic injustice may be exacerbated by modes of partiality which involve these 
problematic practices of epistemic favouritism.
2.1  Partial relationships: a pernicious site of epistemic injustice
In the previous section, I indicated how partial epistemic modes of influence can 
make partial relationships prone to epistemic injustice. In this section, I will clar-
ify why these sorts of relationships may constitute particularly pernicious sites and 
vehicles of epistemic injustice. The type of case I have in mind is one where agents 
might be made susceptible to epistemic injustice within a partial relationship. As 
hinted in the previous part of this paper, these are cases in which the epistemic injus-
tice occurs in the specific context of a relationship and amongst the members that 
make up that relationship unit. Now there are other, more general ways that partial 
relationships might lead to epistemically unjust outcomes – for example, if close 
circles of friends make up something like an echo chamber and band together to 
actively discredit those outside of their network. (Nguyen, 2020, p. 142) These latter 
sorts of cases, however, will be left out of this paper. Furthermore, I should clarify 
that the epistemically partial practices which may make agents vulnerable to epis-
temic injustice in this context must accompany close ties. I am not making claims 
about, for instance, epistemic peer groups (i.e those with shared interests) (Spieker-
mann, 2020, p. 85) who merely epistemically concur with one another but may not 
otherwise be considered close relations. Rather, I refer to close relationship units 
that exert strong epistemic influence over one another as the very consequences of 
those close ties. The final clarification I want to make is that by saying partial rela-
tionships are noteworthy vehicles to epistemic injustice, I am not committing myself 
to the view that partial relationships are themselves necessarily unjust – I do not 
propose to make a final comment on the unresolved debates on partiality in ethics. I 
only point out that the typical nature of these relationships may, in some cases and 
some contexts, conduce to or amplify the incidence of epistemic injustice in worry-
ing ways.
Let us consider, then, what makes partial relationships an especially pernicious 
vehicle of epistemic injustice. The kinds of special care and affective leanings we 
have to those with whom we share partial ties, as I’ve noted in the previous section, 
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can extend to special epistemic allowances we make for them. These allowances can 
be misdirected or misplaced at the hands of one that might treat us less than epistemi-
cally just, however, and it is important that we try to dissect what goes wrong in the 
event that this happens. My view is that epistemic injustice may be easier to mask, 
harder to identify, and difficult to correct for especially within these relationships 
– and this makes for particularly pernicious transmissions of epistemic injustice.
The insight that partial relationships make epistemic injustices more difficult to 
address casts doubts over claims that have been made about ways that social oppres-
sion might confer on agents’ certain epistemic advantages – even as they suffer cer-
tain disadvantages – relating to the supposed “cognitive superiority of alternative 
viewpoints.” (Mills, 1988, p. 245) For example, the view that one who is unprivi-
leged in their social position might have a better grasp of knowledge over social 
reality (Rolin, 2006, p. 125) or that those who have been oppressed have “a spe-
cial kind of lucidity that functions as a corrective of the meta-blindness underly-
ing oppression” (Medina, 2013, p. 186) is complicated if it is not only injustice or 
social oppression, but the further interference of close ties, that replicate the social 
epistemic conditions reinforced by society at large. While gaining certain insights 
about the world through experiences or marginalization, or being less ignorant of 
injustice than others, may be considered a relative epistemic advantage, we must 
consider also that even these epistemic gains are not neutral in context. The insights 
agents acquire about the world will be informed not only by their cool observations 
of social mechanisms, but also by the influence of their closest ties. Partiality, then, 
can interact with existing structures of epistemic oppression.
Take a look at the following example:
“Christina was a 12-year-old girl whose father, Michael, had been sexually 
abusing her for more than a year. One night, a neighbor called the police to 
report a violent argument between Christina’s parents. When the police and 
Child Protective Services representative interviewed Christina, she told them 
what Michael had been doing to her and was removed from the home. At first, 
Christina’s mother, Joanna, did not support or believe her daughter. Joanna 
was financially dependent on her husband and terrified of his violent temper.
---
Joanna had always told herself that it was because she was not a good enough 
wife, but that he was a good father and could be trusted with their daughter. 
It took Joanna several months to recognize that she was a victim of domestic 
violence, and to accept that her daughter had indeed been sexually abused. The 
hardest part for Joanna was to realize just how wrong she had been and to let 
go of her illusions about Michael. It was crucial for Joanna to receive help that 
would allow her to understand that the problem lay with Michael, not with her. 
Once she could acknowledge this, she was able to believe her daughter, and to 
begin healing from her own experience of abuse. Only then could Christina 
and Joanna restore the trust in their mother-daughter relationship.”
(Account taken from report on The National Child Traumatic Stress Network’s 
‘Coping with the Shock of Intrafamilial Sexual Abuse’)
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This case is a rather horrible example of abuse that is not only obviously mor-
ally abhorrent, but also epistemically unjust. It’s clear that the daughter, Christina, 
besides suffering from abuse because of Michael, further suffers as a result of not 
having her claims be believed by her own mother. It seems that the obstacles com-
plicating this situation involves both epistemic injustice proper and the special 
epistemic allowances sometimes made by those embedded in partial ties. Christina 
ought to be believed, but Joanna finds it unimaginable to believe that someone she 
loves could do wrong with her own daughter; she unduly and unjustly dismisses her 
own daughter’s testimony. Joanna may herself, of course, be in a precarious and vul-
nerable position (Michael may have manipulated her, subjecting her to epistemic 
injustice). But while we should not mistake Michael as the culprit for these multiple 
tragedies, we might acknowledge that Joanna is at the same time complicit in the 
epistemic injustice suffered by Christina, not just because she took part in epistemic 
injustice, but also because her complicated relationship with Michael prevented her 
from realizing that she wrongly disbelieved her daughter’s testimony. Her lucidity 
about Michael, in other words, lagged in part because of her partiality to him.
Now we could put this case down as a simple instance of testimonial injustice, 
whereby Joanna perhaps unduly discredited her daughter’s testimony on account 
of, partly, her own prejudices and personal suffering; yet intuitively the story seems 
more complicated than might be suggested by the standard Frickerian framework 
of something like identity-prejudicial credibility deficit. It does not seem to ring 
true that Joanna is merely identity-prejudiced against her daughter’s testimony or 
even that she is naïve about the possibility of abusive relationships. It is plausible to 
imagine that no such skepticism on Joanna’s part might have surfaced in the case of 
another child’s testimony, owing to a more impartial evaluation of testimony regard-
ing abuse. Rather, Joanna’s particular relation to Michael, and the way that her and 
Michael’s relationship informs her inclination to believe – or disbelieve – her daugh-
ter, appears to play a major role in why Christina suffered in this example.
Of course, we can also apply other frameworks to explain Joanna’s falling short 
of lucidity in the circumstances. From a standpoint epistemological viewpoint, often 
discussed by feminist philosophers, we might say that “an agent’s social identity 
[makes] a difference to what an epistemic agent is in a position to know” (Toole, 
2019, p. 598) Scholars recognize that “experiences, social practices, social values 
and the ways in which perception and knowledge production are socially organized” 
mediate the social situatedness of knowledge. (Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis, 2002, 
p. 316) Perhaps the psychological precarity of Joanna’s subjugated position – as a 
potentially gaslighted woman in midst of an abusive and manipulative relationship 
– serves as a barrier to the truth she might otherwise have come to know. On this 
sort of view, we might want to argue that Joanna’s embeddedness in Michael’s dom-
inating narrative is to blame for what is perhaps her inadvertent involvement in epis-
temic injustice towards Christina. This line of thinking is entirely compatible with 
my overarching thesis, which is that partial relationships can amplify and exacerbate 
epistemic injustice.
But my account further reiterates that the wrong of this case is not simply reduc-
ible to inevitable instantiations of testimonial injustice, even if at surface level it 
appears like a basic case of testimonial injustice. My analysis allows us to observe 
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that there is something especially terrible and frightful about it being the case that 
it was Christina’s own mother who failed to believe Christina’s testimony – terri-
ble precisely because the mode of epistemic injustice transmission was not imper-
sonal, but had everything to do with who Michael is to Joanna and what Joanna is 
inclined to believe on the basis of that. Indeed, thinking about partial ties in tandem 
with agents’ individuated social positions, and the social structures in which they are 
embedded, can reveal just how much the personal can overlay the structural, further 
complicating agents’ standing in their social environment. The key here is to rec-
ognize that it is not merely the impersonal social positionings which one occupies 
that raises or lowers one’s vulnerability to epistemic injustice; it is also partly deter-
mined by the peculiarities of individual personal ties, which can play a major role in 
one’s susceptibility to epistemic injustice.
What this case shows us, I think, is that stories of epistemic injustice occurring 
within close relationships present unique challenges. Epistemic injustice is easier 
to mask, obscure, or overlook within these relationships if agents suffering from it, 
or even those perpetuating it, appeal to some justification or excuse apparently war-
ranted by some special relationship – excuses which are otherwise unavailable in 
more impartial relationships.1 Moreover, it is also plausible that these relationships 
tend not to be given much attention as sites of epistemic injustice in the first place, 
given that a large portion of the literature focuses on relations that are often struc-
tural or impersonal ones. The lack of attention on the phenomenon of epistemic 
injustice within partial relations helps explain why instances of epistemic injustice 
can go undetected; but, as we’ve seen above, the nature of personal ties can pre-
sent just as much of a problem as the issues generated by the more general social 
dynamics.
Epistemic injustice is also more difficult to identify – both internally and from a 
more outside perspective – when instances occur within partial relationships. We 
saw that Joanna, for instance, struggled at length with the high-stakes implications 
generated by Christina’s testimony – namely that someone she loves (or thought 
she loved) is capable of doing such terrible things, especially to her own daughter. 
Unlike, say, a neighbour or anyone else who is not privy to these high stakes in their 
assessment of a plausible testimony, Joanna failed initially to identify her errors 
when evaluating the circumstances. It also does not help matters that the epistemic 
exchanges within partial relationships are not typically taken to fall under the realm 
of public scrutiny. As Pauline Kleingeld and Joel Anderson point out, ethical issues 
that arise within something like family relationships are difficult to adjudicate, 
largely because family and justice are “understood as belonging to different spheres, 
one private and the other public.” (2014, p. 3) Justice in the public sphere is sup-
posed to serve as an impersonal, principled way to adjudicate conflicts, whereas the 
interactions in the domestic realm of the loving family are governed by affection and 
1 We might easily imagine agents defending what might plausibly be taken as an instance of epistemic 
injustice by way of protests like “I know him, and he would never do something like that” or “I don’t 
believe my friend would say that.” Similarly, one who is perpetuating or complicit in some form of epis-
temic injustice might defend themselves by appealing to the same kinds of excuses.
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concern for “…the needs of particular loved ones.” (Kleingeld and Anderson, 2014, 
p. 3) Issues within partial relationships, then, are often left to be dealt with exclu-
sively for those actually involved in them. And until someone attempts to intervene 
from the outside (as did the neighbour in the example given above), the problems 
that surface in these partial ties – including the ones due to epistemic biases that 
enable or prolong the presence of epistemic injustice – may go unresolved. Moreo-
ver, if agents are too adamant and defensive to heed outside perspectives, perhaps 
even outside intervention is insufficient to address such problems.
This makes epistemic injustice correspondingly especially difficult to mitigate, 
regulate, and correct in partial relationships. How exactly would we target epis-
temic injustice in sensitized and seemingly private spaces like partial relationships? 
Although various general proposals for the mitigation of epistemic injustice might 
apply in this context, the tendencies and features of specific partial relationships are 
themselves peculiar to those relationships, so it is unclear how general mitigation 
procedures might play out within them. Consider, for instance, Miranda Fricker’s 
suggestion of developing the virtue of testimonial justice, which involves critical 
self-awareness and self-monitoring habits. But is “a corrective anti‐prejudicial vir-
tue that is distinctively reflexive in structure” (Fricker, 2007, p. 91) adequate to cap-
ture and ameliorate the example we’ve just studied? We might suppose that Joanna, 
for instance, is not necessarily lacking in the ability to make reasonable assessments 
of children’s testimony – it is her involvement with an abuser, whom she is manipu-
lated by and fails to be sufficiently emotionally detached from, that interferes with 
her ability to believe her own daughter. What needs fixing, then, does not seem to be 
a general skill or lack of virtue, if we can grant that Joanna is not particularly stunted 
in her critical reflexive abilities of agents’ testimonies outside of these special partial 
bonds.
Now consider another example of a mitigating strategy for epistemic injustice, 
which Havi Carel and Ian Kidd have suggested for the more specific context of ill-
ness and healthcare practice. They claim that “structures of contemporary health-
care practice encourage epistemic injustice because they privilege certain styles of 
articulating testimonies…e.g. privileging impersonal third-person reports, in ways 
that structurally disable certain testimonial and hermeneutical activities.” (Carel 
and Kidd, 2014, p. 4) They suggest a phenomenological toolkit as a way to remedy 
some of this epistemic injustice. The toolkit is meant to be one that helps patients 
develop an understanding of their illness in several steps that include “the phenom-
enological reduction, thematizing illness, and reviewing the ill person‘s being in the 
world.” (Carel and Kidd, 2014, p. 23) The crucial aspect to note in this kind of pro-
posal is that it presumes relationships which are meant to be impartial and consist-
ent, like that of a doctor-patient relationship. The toolkit, then, can target a wide 
range of cases that occur within the healthcare context. But is it possible to develop 
a “toolkit” for those in partial, and non-professional, relationships?
Given that the spectrum of our affective leanings towards particular others vary, 
and are unique to those partial relationships, it is unclear whether trying to exercise 
certain epistemic virtues in general, or making use of epistemic toolkits, can fully 
target and ameliorate the kinds of epistemic vulnerabilities discussed in this sec-
tion. It doesn’t seem quite appropriate, either, to advise that individuals counter their 
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epistemically preferential or favourable tendencies toward their special others by 
treating them, instead, with greater epistemic suspicion. And, given that I’ve clari-
fied earlier in this section that I do not flat out condemn partial relationships per se 
as unjust, it goes without saying that encouraging people to foster fewer close ties 
in the first place, or to avoid entering into partial relationships in general, would 
also be a wrong-headed suggestion, given the tendency in ethics to try and recon-
cile value with partiality. It is rather unfortunate, then, that the complex and deeply 
influencing ties that constitute partial relations make resolving epistemic injustice 
transmission within them all the more challenging.
Recognizing and dealing with epistemic injustice as they occur within partial 
relationships does not seem to leave us with easy solutions that can be generalized, 
given the unique instantiations and circumstances of people’s partial relationships. 
Be that as it may, hopefully this section illuminated the fact that it is in the first place 
possible for partial relationships to be a site of epistemic injustice in ways that are 
unaccounted for by – and are not reducible to – the paradigmatic mechanisms of 
epistemic justice transmission.
3  Conclusion
I have claimed that partial relationships are prone to transmit epistemic injustice 
in particularly pernicious ways, due to the epistemically preferential features that 
typify such partial relationships. Partial relationships are not only negatively impli-
cated as a proxy for epistemic injustice; the way epistemic injustice is experienced 
and dealt with may itself be irreducibly informed by the context of specific partial 
relationships. It should worry us that, quite besides the impersonal structures and 
systems of injustice that make up many paradigmatic cases of epistemic injustice, 
close and intimate relationships are not immune to epistemic injustice transmission. 
On the contrary, they may exacerbate instances of epistemic injustice by making it 
easier to mask, harder to detect, and more difficult to correct.
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